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THE ROLE OF RULES IN LAW AND MORALITY
by
Frederick S. Carney'

T

HE PURPOSE of this Article is to contribute to our understanding of
morality by examining some formal characteristics morality shares
with law. In carrying out this purpose, I shall concentrate upon positive
rather than critical considerations. That is, I shall focus attention upon
how morality, by analogy with law, actually functions in society, not upon
what its ideal content, or the ideal content of law, ought to be. Thus I
shall forego in this Article the more usual preoccupation of the ethicist in
legal discussions to bring moral considerations to bear upon law, and instead inquire into what may be learned about the general structure of
positive morality by applying selected aspects of legal analysis to it.
The basic category that will be employed from law to illumine positive
morality is that of a rule. Of course, rules have received considerable attention recently both in moral philosophy and in moral theology. But the
discussion of rules in moral philosophy and moral theology has occurred,
for the most part, within the context of critical, and not positive, morality.
In moral philosophy, an enormous literature has been produced on the
subject of rule-utilitarianism.1 I am not concerned in this Article to discuss the various types of rule-utilitarianism, or to assess the kinds of arguments that can be made for and against its claims. I do want to point out,
however, that rule-utilitarianism is not especially interested in illuminating
the body of rules that actually exist in society. Rather it concentrates upon
a critical theory to the effect that any rule we may wish to consider,
whether it exists or not, depends for its justification upon how action
governed by it would relate to certain ends or consequences. Thus the
rules that it employs are not so much the de facto ones of society as
theory-dependent ones, that is, rules that rest upon and can be inferred
from the moral doctrine it recommends. These theory-dependent rules, in
the words of David Lyons, "need not be generally observed, acknowledged,
accepted, or referred to. They need only be implied or justified by a given
moral theory."' I should add that attempts to produce non-utilitarian
justification for rules are also, for the most part, operations of critical
morality. And so long as non-utilitarians in pursuit of such justification
merely substitute for utilitarian notions of ends or consequences such alternative notions as those of fairness, or of "a community of men under
*B.A., Ursinus College; B.D., Garrett Theological Seminary; Ph.D., University of Chicago;
Post-doctoral research in Jurisprudence, Oxford University. Associate Professor of Christian Ethics,
Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University.
1 See, e.g., Brandt, Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism, in MORALITY AND THE LANGUAGE OF CONDUCT 107 (H. Castaneda & G. Nakhnikian eds. 1965); Harrod, Utilitarianism Revisited, 45 MIND 137 (1936); Urmson, The Interpretation of the Philosophy of J.S. Mill, 3

PHiLOSOPHICAL Q. 33 (1953).
' D. LYONS, THE FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 146 (1965).
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the idea of law," they continue to focus our attention primarily upon
theory-dependent rather than de facto rules.'
In moral theology critical considerations in the discussion of rules have
also tended in recent years to predominate over positive ones. The issue
in this discipline has been drawn around the claims of situationalists and/or
contextualists that moral rules either are not possible (because the relevant
elements of every truly moral occasion are unique and therefore are not
amenable to such classification as rule employment requires), or, though
possible, are not desirable (because action according to rules leads to moral
legalism and the loss of religious immediacy in moral life).' Against these
claims have come rejoinders in defense of rules in religious morality.' I am
not interested in this Article in assessing these claims and rejoinders, except
inasmuch as they bear directly upon positive morality and for the most
part they do not do so.
The distinction I am drawing between the positive and the critical has
been more readily acknowledged and employed in legal philosophy than
it has in either moral philosophy or moral theology. Jeremy Bentham noted
the difference between what he called the province of the expositor and
the province of the censor. "To the province of the expositor," he said, "it
belongs to explain to us what, as he supposes, the law is: to that of the
censor, to observe to us what he thinks it ought to be."' John Austin observed that "the existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit another."' The same distinction has been fundamental to the writings of
John Gray,8 Wesley Hohfeld, Hans Kelsen, ° H.L.A. Hart," and others
who engage in what is now often called analytic jurisprudence.
In recent years, moreover, the idea of a rule as illuminating the concept
of law has been given a great deal of attention by writers in analytic jurisprudence. Especially is this true of Hart, who claims that "in the combination of two types of rules (those imposing duties and those conferring
powers) lies . . . 'the key to the science of jurisprudence.' ,12
It does not therefore seem inappropriate to turn to these legal writers,
and especially to Hart, to ascertain to what extent the insights they have
gained into the role of rules in positive law may also be applicable to the
role of rules in positive morality. That they themselves have already made
some important applications of their rule analysis to moral philosophy,
though evident enough in their writings, should not deter us from further
'See, e.g., Diggs, Rules and Utilitarianism, I AM. PHILOSOPHICAL Q. 32 (1964); Rawls, Justice
as Fairness, 67 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 164 (1958).
'See, e.g., J. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS (1966); P. LEHMANN, ETHICS IN A CHRISTIAN
CONTEXT

(1963).

' See, e.g., P. RAMSEY, DEEDS AND RULES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1967); Carney, Deciding in
the Situation: What Is Required?, in NORM AND CONTEXT IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 3 (G. Outka
& P. Ramsey eds. 1968).
6J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 7 (W. Harrison ed. 1948) (emphasis
original).
'J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 184 (H. Hart ed. 1954).
'J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCE OF THE LAW (1909).
'W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS (1919).
'OH. KELSEN,
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attempts to explore the manner in which positive morality may be understood, through the idea of a rule, to function somewhat analogously to
law. In any event, my reason for believing that the subject matter of this
Article is appropriate for the purposes of this journal rests upon the potentialities of this analogy.
There are three basic issues to which I shall hereafter address myself.
The first is the nature of rules and their functioning in positive morality.
The second is whether rule behavior can be said to fill the entire range of
moral action. The third is the conditions under which we can properly
say that any particular moral rule actually exists. Each of these issues has
been discussed by Hart and others. My analysis will draw heavily upon
their published work. But it will also, in each instance, either take issue
with them or further develop points that they have made or both.
I. NATURE AND FUNCTION OF RULES IN POSITIVE MORALITY

The idea of a rule is an integral part of wide ranges of human activity.
There are rules of games, rules of language, rules of etiquette, rules of clubs
or associations, as well as rules of law and rules of morality. In general,
it can be said that a rule, at least in the sense I shall be using the term, is a
standard the acceptance of which brings the relevant behavior under normative character. It designates a class of actions whose performance is
either required, prohibited, or permitted. Thus if one accepts a rule, he
is by that acceptance committed to conform his behavior to that specified
by the rule.
To be distinguished from behavior according to a rule is behavior that
merely has a recognizable pattern to it. Almost all educated Americans
read a newspaper daily, but one would hardly say that we are conforming
to a social rule in so doing. It is a mere fact of identical behavior. But our
driving on the right side of the road in America is not an instance of our
conduct just happening to be identical. Rather the existence of a rule of
the road is a reason for this particular pattern.
Not only is a rule a reason for action or forbearance, but it also serves
as a reason for criticism of our own and others' behavior. Deviations from
a rule are considered lapses or faults subject to criticism. One would hardly
regard not reading a newspaper today as censorious. But one would disapprove the failure to drive on the right side of the road or to keep a
promise that had been properly made. In these instances the existence of
rules is a ground for disapproving the conduct.
We may also distinguish between two different ways of conforming to
rules, namely, external and internal. In external conformity persons may
follow a rule because of inertia, because of desires to avoid penalties or
social pressure that disobedience would entail, or because of some personal
advantages to be obtained thereby. This external conformity requires mere
obedience to the rule for whatever reasons. In internal conformity, however, persons follow a rule because they personally accept it as an appropriate guide for their actions and those of others. It designates a practice
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that they are concerned to maintain and perhaps to teach. This internal
aspect entails not only obedience to a rule but also acceptance of it. It is
evident that a society or group can exist in which a large number of its
members conform to its rules only externally. Nevertheless, the society or
group could scarcely exist unless some of its members at least have internal
conformity with its rules. Furthermore, a healthy society or group will
normally have as one of its characteristics the internal acceptance of its
rules by a vast majority of its members.
Having made these brief comments on the empirical nature of a rule,
I want to turn now to the basic types of rules that are to be found in law
and morality. It is at this point that we can observe a very interesting
parallel between law and morality. Hart distinguishes two types of rules
in law, those imposing duties and those conferring powers. The latter he
further delineates into rules conferring private powers (to make contracts, enter into marriages, etc.) and rules conferring public powers (to
enact legislation, adjudicate litigation, etc.). I think it would not be inappropriate to his general understanding of law also to divide his first type
of rule into those imposing determinate duties (to avoid homicide, report
for military service, etc.) and those imposing indeterminate duties (to
charge a fair rate, exercise due care, etc.). Although Hart calls this latter
type a "variable standard," rather than a rule,13 it is difficult to see what a
variable standard would be within his system unless it were the expression
of a kind of rule. It is in this sense that this further delineation of duties
is present at least implicitly in his rule theory.
Thus we are in a position to suggest four types of rules in law: those
imposing determinate duties, those imposing indeterminate duties, those
conferring private powers, and those conferring public powers. I shall look
at each of these in turn to inquire into the sense in which it can be said
to be present in morality also.
Rules imposing determinate duties are perhaps the most obvious ones in
morality. They not only make moral demands upon us, but their central
core of obligation is sufficiently clear and fixed that on most occasions in
which they function we experience little or no difficulty ascertaining what
precise action or forbearance is expected of us. Our moral world abounds
with such determinate duties: we ought not to commit murder, we ought
not to steal, we ought to keep our promises, we ought to tell the truth, etc.
These all seem to be widely-accepted moral rules of society in general.
Moreover, particular groups within society may have additional rules of
this type that their members are expected to adhere to. These rules may
have to do with sexual behavior, gambling, the use of intoxicants, the
allocation of personal resources, etc. Rules imposing determinate duties are
so evident in positive morality, and so well-acknowledged by moralists,
that nothing more need be said about them now.
Rules imposing indeterminate duties, however, while they are often discussed by lawyers in connection with variable standards of due care and
'1id. at 130.
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fair price, are seldom mentioned by moralists. Yet I think it unquestionable that they actually form a part of our positive morality. For example,
while the rule that a husband ought to avoid having sexual relations with
anyone except his wife expresses a determinate duty, the rule that a husband, under normal circumstances, ought to have sexual relations with his
wife expresses an indeterminate duty. Clearly sexual relations are a duty
of marriage, long recognized as such in our morality. But what precisely
is required in individual cases? How often should such sexual relations
occur to fulfill the duty? In what context? How long ought they to continue in life?
The moral rule requiring sexual relations between spouses is not an
isolated instance of indeterminate duty. There are other moral rules as well
that also impose this type of duty, such as those requiring that we provide
our children a proper upbringing, that we act with gratitude toward our
benefactors, that we assist the neighbor who has recently become destitute,
etc. What is common to them all is that they leave somewhat open to our
discretion and experience the judgment as to what precise actions and forebearances can properly fulfill the demand they place upon us. I say only
"somewhat open" for three reasons. First, the variable standard they set
forth can be understood to exclude outer fringes of clearly inappropriate
conduct. Second, this standard provides a basic criterion for judging from
within the circumference of all possible actions those which may be considered to be appropriate. And third, it does leave the actor and his critics
with some point of reference for later review and possible criticism of our
judgment.
Rules conferring private powers set forth the conditions under which
persons may voluntarily extend their duties. Such rules presuppose the
existence of common practices within which such powers are operative.
In morality we usually think of promising as the classic instance of a
practice within which rules conferring private powers operate. But we
should also think of marrying, of contracting, and of other forms of
agreeing that have moral, and not merely legal, aspects to them. Nevertheless, the making of promises will do to illustrate the type of rules that
confer private powers. There are, it would seem, widely-recognized conditions that must be met for one rightly to exercise the power to promise.
One must be competent in age and mentality for the promise to be binding,
and therefore for it to be a true promise. He must make the promise freely,
that is, without physical or undue psychological coercion. And the promise must not be for the performance of an act against public moral policy.
These conditions are widely-recognized within the practice of promising,
the failure to conform to any one of which serves as a disqualifier of the
particular attempt to extend the duties of the would-be promisor and the
rights of the would-be promisee. Thus persons may, if they wish, extend
the network of their duties (and rights) considerably beyond those determinate and indeterminate ones which mere membership in a society
or group requires.
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Rules conferring public powers indicate the manner in which designated
moral agencies may clarify or revise the moral duties of large groups of
people, and how such agencies are to be constituted and operated. The
positive morality of some churches and other groups within society includes such rules. For example, the Roman Catholic Church assigns to the
Holy Father the power under specified conditions to proclaim and adjudicate moral positions that thereafter are understood to be binding upon
members of this church. And some secular communities would seem to
lodge in their notables the power to determine the moral practice therein
in matters of racial interaction and interfaith relations. I shall discuss this
matter at greater length in the third part of this Article.
This four-fold typology of moral rules should help focus attention upon
the remarkable breadth of positive morality. It is somewhat unfortunate
that most moralists when writing of de facto rules limit their discussion
to rules imposing determinate duties, occasionally augmented by instances
of rules conferring private powers. This has been true even of Hart, who,
while finding all four types in the law, found in morality only rules imposing determinate duties and rules conferring private powers. But I have
suggested that the analogy of morality with law is considerably more complete than this. And I shall attempt to give further evidence that this is
so in the next two parts of this paper.
Before I turn to them, however, I wish to conclude this discussion of
the nature of rules and of their functioning with brief comments on two
problems of rule employment in positive morality, namely, "borderline
cases" and "excusable violations." To say that we know in most instances
what conformity to rules requires of us is not to imply that there are not
occasional borderline cases in which our obligations and powers are not
immediately clear. Such cases may arise because of difficulty in deciding
whether a certain kind of conduct is actually that envisaged by the rule
or not. We generally know, for example, what promises are, and that we
ought to refrain from breaking them. In some instances, however, we may
not be sure whether a certain conversation in which we were engaged
actually resulted in a promise or not. And thus we are not always clear
what is morally expected of us, even according to the rules we embrace.
But there is nothing in the nature of rule-conformity that necessitates for
its functioning and general viability a complete and mechanical precision.
Rules of all four types can function quite effectively with some measure
of discretion remaining to persons attempting to apply them in borderline
cases, provided that a central core of meaning and application is clear.
Different from borderline cases are those involving what is often called
excusable violations of a rule. Here we are concerned with what seem to be
obvious transgressions that we may nevertheless condone because of some
overriding reason. We may, for example, break a promise to take our family
on an outing in order to help a neighbor whose son has just been in an
accident. If moral rules were to come equipped with long lists of conditions of application, we should probably be able to consider most cases of
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excusable violations as lying outside the force of the rule, and thus to this
extent justified. But moral rules are less likely than legal ones to be qualified with a series of qualifications, even those quite specific ones that impose determinate duties. Such heavily-conditioned rule statements would
be too complex to be understood by most persons to whom they are to
apply, and too complicated to be taught our children in their formative
years of moral training. Thus we understandably resort to the shorthand
notion of excusable violations. But these seem to be, in fact, the acts that
would be justified as not violating the rules if all the conditions of application were to be contained in and transmitted with the rules themselves.
II.

THE EXTENT OF RULE BEHAVIOR IN MORAL ACTION

The second major problem of this essay is whether rule behavior can
be rightly said to cover the entire range of moral action. Hart believes
not. He writes that "obligation and duty are only the bedrock of morality,
even of social morality, and there are forms of morality which extend
beyond the accepted shared morality of particular societies."" This statement refers, of course, to all aspects of morality, whether positive or
critical, that extend beyond the social morality of rules, a somewhat different formulation from mine. But let us look at what he has in mind. He
discusses three aspects of morality that extend beyond the social morality
of rule behavior with its obligations and duties. The first is what he calls
conduct according to moral ideals. The second is moral criticism. But since
this seems to refer to critical morality, not to an element within positive
morality that extends beyond behavior according to rules, we may dismiss
it from our present considerations. The third is private morality, which
for the most part he seems to treat as private ideals.
We are left with moral ideals and private morality. And our problem
is to ascertain whether either or both point to dimensions of positive
morality that extend beyond rule behavior. Hart writes regarding moral
ideals that:
[T]here exist side by side with the structure of mandatory moral obligations
and duties and the relatively clear rules that define them, certain moral ideals.
The realization of these is not taken, as duty is, as a matter of course, but
as an achievement deserving praise. The hero and the saint are extreme types
of those who do more than their duty. What they do is not like obligation or
duty, something which can be demanded of them, and failure to do it is

not regarded as wrong or a matter for censure.
I should like to examine a couple of cases in which this is held to be so.
Hart himself does not provide them. But he does call attention to an article
by J. 0. Urmson on saints and heroes that does."5 Before discussing his
cases, Urmson distinguishes between saintly and heroic actions attributable
to performance according to moral duty and those attributable to performance according to moral ideals. In the former, he writes, we call a
4

1d. at 177.
15Id. at 177-78 (emphasis in original).
'e Urmson, Saints and Heroes, in ESSAYS
1

IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 198

(A. Melden ed. 1958).
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person saintly or heroic who, either with abnormal self-control or without
effort, "does his duty in such difficult contexts that most men would fail
in them." But in the latter, we call him saintly or heroic because he "does
actions that are far beyond the limits of his duty."" Since the former is
acknowledged by Urmson to be illustrative, however unusual, of rule
behavior, it is to the latter that we need to direct our attention, for it is
here that he believes he has found an inadequacy in the classification of
all moral actions as obligatory, forbidden, or permitted. 8
His first case is an imaginary, but quite plausible, incident in which a
squad of soldiers is practicing the throwing of live hand grenades.
A grenade slips from the hand of one of them and rolls on the ground near
the squad; one of them sacrifices his life by throwing himself on the grenade
and protecting his comrades with his own body. It is quite unreasonable to
suppose that such a man must be impelled by the sort of emotion that he
might be impelled by if his best friend were in the squad; he might only
have just joined the squad; it is clearly an action having moral status. But
if the soldier had not thrown himself on the grenade would he have failed
in his duty? Though clearly he is superior in some way to his comrades, can
we possibly say that they failed in their duty by not trying to be the one
who sacrificed himself? If he had not done so, could anyone have said to him,
You ought to have thrown yourself on the grenade? Could a superior have
decently ordered him to do it? The answer to all these questions is plainly
negative. We clearly have here a case of a moral action, a heroic action,
which cannot be subsumed under the classification whose inadequacy we are
exposing. 9
On the contrary, there are several ways of looking at this case as one of
rule behavior, any one of which would be sufficient to make the action
performed by the soldier classifiable as one of duty. First, there are obviously groups within the military in which membership precisely implies
accepting such actions when necessary as duties. Certain commando groups
specifically require readiness to accept death to save the lives of one's
fellows or to insure the success of the mission. In such groups one can
properly reproach himself and be reproached by others for failing to perform such a duty. Furthermore, the action can be commanded by a
superior.
Second, even apart from special groups within the military in which
such action is considered a duty, a soldier can be part of an extra-military
group, be it religious or social, in which the giving of one's life is accepted
as a duty under some circumstances, such as the saving of the life of another, the avoidance of the infliction of injury, or the refusal to deny one's
faith. One can point to the early Christian martyrs, who understood themselves to be part of a community of men acknowledging such duties
wherever they may be and holding themselves strictly responsible for their
" Id. at 201.
"8For further discussion of non-obligatory moral action, see R. GRICE, THE GROUNDS OF
MORAL JUDGMENT (1967); Chisholm, Supererogation and Offence: A Conceptual Scheme for
Ethics, 5 RATIO 1 (1963), in ETHICS 412 (J. Thomson & G. Dworkin eds. 1968); Feinberg,
Supererogation and Rules, 71 INT'L J. OF ETHICS 276 (1961), in ETHICS 391 (J. Thomson & D.
Dworkin eds. 1968).
19 Urmson, supra note 16, at 202-03.
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performance. One can also point to such present-day phenomena as Quaker
hospital units engaged in front-line operations or some non-violent civil
rights groups engaged in provocative campaigns which expect sacrifice of
this kind if the need should arise.
Third, apart from membership in an actual group, either military or
extra-military, in which such duties are expected, a soldier can hold to a
private rule that makes such behavior morally non-optional. There is no
reason why a personal standard of behavior adopted by an individual, and
serving for him as a moral guide, cannot function in the same manner
that social rules do, and with the same moral characters of obligation,
prohibition, and permission. Of course, his own conscience would have to
provide the moral pressure for conformity that for social rules often comes
from others. But granting this, another person, having become acquainted
with his private rule, could assess whether an action is right or wrong
according to it. In this sense, even a private rule has a public aspect.
These are three possible ways of understanding the soldier's deed as an
instance of rule behavior, and of avoiding the conclusion that his action
was beyond the call of duty whatsoever. Urmson admits that his soldier
might understand himself as having an obligation to act as he did. He
writes, "I have no desire to present the act of heroism as one that is
naturally regarded as optional by the hero, as something that he might not
do; I concede that he might regard himself as being obliged to act as he
does." But then he adds, wrongly, I believe, that if the soldier "were to
survive the action only a modesty, so excessive as to appear false could
make him say, 'I only did my duty,' for we know, and he knows, that he
has done more than duty requires. Further, though he might say to himself that so to act was a duty, he could not say so beforehand to anyone
else, and no one else could ever say it. Subjectively, we may say, at the
time of action, the deed presented itself as a duty, but it was not a duty.""
Apparently, what we now have is a case in which Urmson admits that
the soldier might well regard this deed as his duty, and nevertheless thinks
we should not rightly consider it to be his duty. Why is there this discrepancy? It seems, and here we get to the core of the problem, that an
unnecessarily limiting condition is being employed by Urmson (and Hart)
in the definition of duty. This condition is that a moral standard must be
generally acknowledged throughout a given society to be a rule. They assume that if it is only acknowledged by some group within society, or perhaps only by an individual person, it is not so much a rule as an ideal. And
we are not permitted to apply the notions of obligation, prohibition, and
permission to it, except perhaps in either a subjective or an analogical sense.
But surely this is a piece of unnecessary verbal legislation, for not only does
society in general have norms that function as moral rules, such as acknowledged moral claims that we should keep our promises and not tell lies, but
also groups within society have norms that function as moral rules, such
as claims that their members should give their lives for others under cer0

' Id. at 203.
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tain conditions, avoid the use of intoxicating beverages, or even discriminate against persons of another race in favor of one's own. These latter
possess all the attributes of positive moral rules that the former do, except
the extent of their generality. They may seem odd, or even immoral, to
those of us who do not accept them. But this is no reason for failing to
acknowledge that they exist as rules in the positive morality of some
groups, and as such impose duties upon their adherents.
What perhaps has given rise to this error is the justifiable belief that a
duty must be something within the general capacity of those who are
expected to conform to it. Thus, to use Urmson's case, it may well be that
the action of the soldier is not normally imposed upon all members of the
military. But this is no reason for denying that it could be a duty for
some persons within the military for whom it is within their capacity to
fulfill, and by whom it has been accepted as the morally appropriate thing
to do, either through membership in a group expecting such behavior or
through an individual's imposing such behavior upon himself."'
Urmson's second illustration can be interpreted in the same way as his
first, namely, as not demonstrating what he thinks it does. Addressing himself to what he considers to be an instance of saintliness, he says that:
[A]fter Francis of Assisi had finished preaching to the birds on a celebrated
occasion his companions gathered around him to praise and admire. But
Francis himself was not a bit pleased; he was full of self-reproach that he
had hitherto failed in what he now considered to be his duty to preach to
the feathered world. There is indeed no degree of saintliness that a suitable
person may not come to consider it to be his duty to achieve. Yet there is a
world of difference between his failure to have preached hitherto to the birds
and a case of straightforward breach of duty, however venial. First, Francis
could without absurdity reproach himself for his failure to do his duty, but
it would be quite ridiculous for anyone else to do so, as one could have done

ifhe had failed to keep his vows, for example. Second, it is not recorded that
Francis ever reproached anyone else for failure to preach to the birds as a
breach of duty. He could claim this action for himself as a duty and could
perhaps have exhorted others to preach to the birds; but there could be no
question of reproaches for not so acting.'

It is, of course, very easy to respond to Urmson by saying that stranger
actions than this have been accepted as duties by organized groups within
society, and imposed upon their members. But here again Urmson is unnecessarily limiting the occasions of rule conformity. He writes about
Francis of Assisi that "since nobody else can call upon him to perform
such an act as they can call upon him to tell the truth and to keep his
promises, there is here a most important difference from the rock-bottom
duties which are duties for all and from every point of view, and to which
anyone may draw attention. '
To the contrary, members of a group who accept such an action as a
duty can certainly call upon him, who is also a member, to follow the rule
See R. GRIcE, supra note 18, at 203-04.
Urmson, supra note 16, at 203-04.
23
1 d. at 204.
21
2
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of preaching to the birds. Moral rules do not depend for their existence
upon their imposing "duties for all and for every point of view, and to
which anyone may draw attention," although some moral rules do meet
these general conditions.
Perhaps a limited analogy with law is appropriate. There obviously are
laws that exist for the whole of a national society, even sometimes parallel
customs and legislation for the whole of a civilization. But there are also
laws of more limited jurisdiction, applying only in one small nation or
even in one state or subdivision within a nation. Yet nobody would deny
to them the character of law. The analogy is limited because moral groups
are not normally geographical in their extensiveness, as legal entities for the
most part are. But even here some of the laws of the United States, for
example, apply to its citizens traveling or living outside its continental
limits, and in this sense operate somewhat like rules of a moral group that
apply wherever its members are to be found. The chief point is that the
rules neither of law nor of positive morality require as a condition of their
existence an applicability coextensive with society at large, although some
rules in both law and morality do meet this condition.
As a general conclusion about this matter, it can be said that while rule
behavior may not be inclusive of the entire range of positive morality, it
nevertheless covers a much wider part of that range than either Hart or
Urmson acknowledged. This is true because of the rule-oriented morality
of groups and individuals within society as well as of society itself. The
claim I am making is that a large part of what Hart and Urmson mean
by moral ideals and personal morality is actually the rule conduct of groups
and individuals.
What areas of positive morality can we point to that may contain
instances of non-rule behavior? There are, I think, two areas. The first is
that of the relatively solitary moral act whose occurrence is so rare that
one might hesitate to refer to it as governed by a rule. In such instances
one probably applies a completely general standard such as love or justice,
as the morally controlling feature of the act. It is possible that Urmson's
soldier, if he had had time to reflect, would have considered his act in
this light. But it is not necessary that he should have done so. As already
pointed out, he might also have acted, and more probably did act, in
conformity to a rule in the senses already indicated.
The second area in which positive morality might be understood to include actions beyond those of rule behavior is when optimalizing requirements are involved. There are moral occasions when one understands himself to be bound to choose the best solution to a problem in which several
alternatives are available, for example, when deciding how most beneficially to allocate one's financial contributions to various deserving agencies and individuals or when confronting the moral requirement to vote
wisely in an election involving several candidates. Even these occasions
can be understood as instances of rule behavior that constitute a variation
on the indeterminate duty type. It will be recalled that in such duties one
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has a moral demand upon him in the form of a variable standard that
makes some kinds of behavior non-optional and yet leaves open to his discretion and experience the decision as to which of several actions or forebearances he will adopt, each of which would acceptably meet the standard.
The difference is that we consider the variable standard in such indeterminate duties to require the selection of a single action or forebearance that
is judged as optimific within the capacities of the rule follower. Interpreted
in this way, we could appropriately say that we have a moral duty to
contribute to such and such an agency or to vote for a particular candidate.
This has its analogue in the legal world in situations in which public
agencies have the duty of deciding which of several applicants for an airline route is best qualified or the duty of allocating cultural funds wisely
to various private and public associations. But optimific-rule performance
may stretch the notion of a moral rule rather widely. And there may be
reasons for thinking of such moral performances, while existing within
positive morality, as going beyond the area more usually associated with
rule behavior. The problem is basically one of definition and classification.

III.

WHEN DOES A MORAL RULE EXIST?

The third part of this Article is devoted to the ontology of rules, or
the conditions under which any particular rule can be said actually to exist.
Hart has described two kinds of conditions, the presence of either of which
is sufficient to enable us to say that a rule exists. The first is that a rule
be efficacious, that is, that it function as a rule in the lives of persons to
whom it applies by serving as a standard that makes some forms of behavior non-optional or that grants power to perform certain actions under
given conditions. This existence test is an empirical one. Could an external
observer who did not himself accept the rule nevertheless confirm that
"as a matter of fact, a given mode of behavior was generally accepted as
a standard?" "It is in this way," Hart writes, that we can "interpret and
verify the assertion that in England a rule-though not a legal one-exists
that we must bare the head upon entering a church." 4
The second way in which a rule can be said to exist is for it to be valid,
that is, for it to be a proper member of a system of rules the existence
of which can be empirically verified. In order for a system to exist there
must not only be primary rules imposing duties, but also secondary rules
of a public sort that "specify the ways in which the primary rules may be
conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of
their violation conclusively determined."' These secondary rules are of
three sorts, (1) the rule of recognition, which serves as a criterion for
identifying the primary and other, secondary, rules, (2) rules of change,
which provide for the introduction, variation, and elimination of primary
rules, and (3) rules of adjudication, which enable designated individuals
to determine whether primary rules have been broken. To affirm, then,
24
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that a given primary rule is valid, as distinguished from efficacious, "is to
recognize it as passing the tests provided by the rule of recognition and
so as a rule of the system."' It need not be efficacious if it can be acknowledged as valid according to the rule of recognition. In this combination of
efficacy and validity we have, according to Hart, the inclusive conditions
of the existence of a rule.
However, in addition to providing this illuminating clarification of rule
ontology, Hart also makes the claim that moral rules, by their very nature,
exist only by virtue of their efficacy and not at all by virtue of their being
valid within a system. And this marks for him a major distinction between
law and morality. Most law has both primary and secondary rules, and
therefore can be considered to be a system. 7 On the other hand, morality
has only primary rules, and therefore functions as a set." It is this claim
that I am now concerned to test.
Let me be doubly sure that I have made clear what the issue at stake is
before I proceed further. There are obviously rules of morality (such as
that one ought to keep this promise and not tell lies) the existence of which
can be positively ascertained by observing that they are generally conformed to. The fact that there are sometimes violations of these rules, and
even manifestations of indifference to them, does not in itself keep us from
acknowledging that they exist so long as they generally serve as standards
of conduct. The determination as to when such rules are so much ignored
within a society or group as to be non-existent is something like the problem of ascertaining how many hairs a man must lose to be bald, and need
not concern us for present purposes. Our central question is whether there
are also primary rules of morality that depend for their existence upon
their having been properly established, upheld, or at least clarified by some
kind of representative and accepted procedure involving rules of recognition, change, and adjudication. Hart says no. Thus positive morality is
understood by him to contain no rules conferring public powers, and thus
unlike positive law to operate only as a set and not also as a system.
I should like to look at two instances of positive morality that may call
for partial revision of Hart's claim regarding the ontology of moral rules.
The first is the positive morality of some churches. I have in mind those
churches that have traditionally assumed the responsibility to define and
clarify the rules governing some aspects of their members' lives. Perhaps
the Roman Catholic Church constitutes the most notable contemporary
example. Here is a group spread over many nations whose morality coexists
with the morality of society at large and the moralities of many other
groups within society. It would not be correct to say of it that its moral
rules exist only inasmuch as they are in fact efficacious in the lives of its
members. For there is in this group a widely-recognized rule of recognition that designates certain historic documents and traditions that serve
2
"1d. at 100.
27 The major exceptions for Hart are primitive law and international law.

" Positive morality is to this extent understood by Hart to be like primitive or international
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as the final criteria in matters of faith and morals and that point to an
organized magisterium whose function it is to clarify and uphold the faith
and morals of its members, even to bring moral pressure to bear upon the
members to comply with the moral rules of the Church. In this sense there
are secondary rules as well as primary ones, and it is meaningful to speak
of its rules-such as the one (or ones) on birth control-as valid according
to the criteria of the system. One does not have to search out empirically
where the rules are in fact efficacious in the lives of the members. They
exist by virtue of their being validly proclaimed as rules by the Church
according to its accepted procedures. So long as the magisterial authority
to define primary rules of morality is accepted by Roman Catholics so
long will at least some primary rules of morality exist in Roman Catholicism
by virtue of their validity within its moral system.
Carefully to be distinguished from this type of situation is one in which
the moral pronouncements of churches, many of them Protestant, are not
thought of as binding upon the membership by virtue of their institutional
validity, but rather as recommendations to the members for their autonomous consideration and, hopefully, adoption. Such pronouncements may be
accompanied by extensive efforts to inform the members about the reasons
for them, and to persuade the members to adopt them as their own moral
rules. In such situations there are only primary rules, and not also secondary rules, of positive morality.
Also to be noted within church groups is the difference between the
legal and administrative aspects on the one hand, and the moral aspects
on the other. Churches do conduct what may be called legal and administrative proceedings within their structures, such as the formal validation
of marriages, the reception and expulsion of members, the assignment and
transfer of clergy, and so forth. But while these often have moral aspects
related to them, it is not to them that I am referring when I speak of the
rules of some churches functioning as moral systems, for they involve the
type of formal proceedings that can more properly be thought of as legal
than as moral.
The second instance that may be understood as providing a qualification
of Hart's claim that morality involves only primary rules of obligation is
that of the manner in which certain moral changes have occurred in local
communities. Here I would like to propose, with some tentativeness, Dallas'
inauguration of racial desegregation. This community can be generally
described as led and directed, at least until quite recently and probably
even today, by a rather cohesive body of prominent and dedicated businessmen. When confronted in the early sixties with the spectre of race
riots as they were occurring in Little Rock and New Orleans and highly
aware of the damage to economic and social life such riots could inflict on
Dallas if they were to occur there, these businessmen determined to desegregate Dallas quickly, effectively, and peacefully. Prior to the summer
of 1963, Dallas was, for the most part, segregated in fact, and the prevailing positive moral rules were to the effect that it was right that it
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should be so. These businessmen consciously decided not to change the law
to accomplish this purpose. Rather they decided to employ, among other
things, moral means to accomplish their purposes. They understood themselves as having authority to define the moral rules of their community in
such matters, and believed that the populace would accept their authority
to clarify and change the moral rules pertaining to relations between the
races. In this belief they were, I think, proved for the most part correct.
The citizens of Dallas did permit them to exercise this function, and thus
implicitly acknowledged secondary rules of recognition and change, at least
in this area and probably in others, affecting the general life of the community. The result was that within one summer's duration Dallas moved
from a community in which it was not morally right to be desegregated
to one in which it was not morally right not to be desegregated. The rules
of its positive morality were changed in this respect. And to this extent
we can say that certain new community moral rules in Dallas were valid
according to the rule of recognition even before we got around to verifying that they were efficacious in the lives of the populace.
It is necessary to distinguish the changes in the moral rules that occurred
from two other phenomena that took place simultaneously. The first was
that Dallas business leaders took administrative actions to integrate the
hotels and restaurants, and to upgrade the jobs of Negroes in industrial and
commercial enterprises. The second was that these men also attempted to
persuade Dallas citizens that the moral changes they were "legislating"
were necessary for the good of the community and should be conformed
to. But even after we allow for these two kinds of measures taken simultaneously, it can still be said that these leaders did perform as officials
within a moral system in which they anticipated and received the acknowledgment of the community that they had the authority to so act.
These are two instances, a church group and a local community, in which
not only primary rules of moral obligation, but also secondary moral rules
seem to be operative. Others could also be cited. My point is not that positive morality possesses rules conferring public powers, and therefore the
quality of a system, to the same extent as does law. Obviously law is much
more to be characterized in this way than is morality. My point rather is
that positive morality does in some instances possess secondary rules, and
therefore that one must sometimes be prepared to determine the existence
or non-existence of particular rules in morality by inquiring not only into
their efficacy, but also sometimes into their validity.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It may be helpful to recall at this point the basic assumption of this
Article, which has been that the study of the concept of law may contribute to our understanding of the formal character of positive morality.

To proceed on this assumption is to reverse the more usual direction of
discussions of the relationships of law and morality. In those discussions
the basic issues are more often than not the actual or potential contribu-
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tions of morality to law. Here, however, we have been concerned with
one of the ways by which law may contribute to morality, namely, by
serving as an illuminating analogy for positive morality.
The time has now come to summarize the major findings that have been
derived from the application of this analogy to moral practice. The first
is that there are four distinct types of rules in positive morality, and that
these bear a close resemblance to those found in law. These types are rules
imposing determinate duties, rules imposing indeterminate duties, rules
conferring private powers, and rules conferring public powers.
The second finding is that rule behavior can be understood to embrace
a much wider part of the total range of positive morality than has generally
been acknowledged by moralists. This becomes evident when we examine
the operation of rules not only in the morality of society at large, but also
in the moralities of groups and individuals within society. The analogy of
morality with the plural jurisdictions of law has extensive justification
here. Two areas within positive morality may, nevertheless, not involve
rule behavior. These are the relatively unique actions the unusualness
of which does not lend itself readily to rule formulation and the moral
optimalization demands sometimes found in morality that require a single
best action to be performed which is not usually determinable outside of
specific knowledge of particular contexts.
The third finding is that it is not correct to say that positive morality,
unlike law, contains only primary and never secondary rules, and that

therefore morality has always the quality of a set and never that of a
system. Rather it is correct to say that positive morality would seem to

have considerably fewer manifestations of secondary rules than does law
and therefore functions less often as a system than does law.

